At the 25th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Tianjin in 2025, President Xi Jinping once again articulated a vision for the future of global governance that challenges the structures of power long dominated by Western hegemony. In his address, Xi emphasized five central principles that form the core of his approach: sovereign equality, adherence to international law, true multilateralism, people-centered development, and real actions over empty promises. These principles were not presented as abstract ideals but as counter-strategies to the entrenched legacies of imperialism, neoliberal exploitation, and neocolonial practices that continue to define much of the global order. In essence, Xi situated the SCO not merely as a regional bloc but as a vehicle of decolonization in global politics, one that seeks to redistribute agency to the Global South and create a more equitable system of governance in the twenty-first century.
This vision recalls the spirit of Bandung in 1955, when leaders of Asian and African nations articulated the principles of peaceful coexistence, non-alignment, and sovereign equality as a collective response to the Cold War binary and the persistent dominance of Western powers. Bandung was not simply a diplomatic event but a decolonial moment where postcolonial states sought to assert their place in a world order that had marginalized them for centuries. Xi’s five principles of global governance initiatives can be seen as a contemporary extension of that Bandung ethos, reimagined for a world now marked by neoliberal globalization, technological interdependence, and ecological crisis. Where Bandung stood against the political and military hegemony of the Cold War superpowers, Xi’s initiatives stand against the financial and institutional hegemony of today’s neoliberal institutions, which continue to subordinate developing countries under regimes of debt, trade restrictions, and unequal access to technology and markets. The principle of sovereign equality is central here. Xi’s insistence that all nations, regardless of size, wealth, or military capacity, deserve an equal voice in international affairs stands in stark contrast to the current global system where a few powers dominate institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and even the United Nations Security Council. The persistence of this inequality reflects what Antonio Gramsci would call a “hegemonic order,” where domination is exercised not only through coercion but also through the consent manufactured by powerful states and their intellectual, financial, and cultural apparatuses. By promoting sovereign equality, the SCO challenges this order and signals a “war of position” against global hegemony. Unlike a direct confrontation, this is a strategy of constructing an alternative bloc of moral, political, and economic leadership that gradually undermines the legitimacy of the existing order.
Equally important is the emphasis on international law, which Xi frames as the bedrock of global stability and justice. Yet, his vision highlights a paradox: while the West invokes international law selectively, often as a tool to legitimize intervention or sanction regimes that do not align with its interests, the SCO advocates for consistent and universal application. For instance, interventions in Iraq or Libya were framed under the rhetoric of humanitarianism and democracy but violated the principle of sovereignty and destabilized entire regions. By contrast, the SCO’s commitment to non-interference and respect for territorial integrity is positioned as a corrective to these imperial practices. This principle also resonates strongly with the postcolonial critique of “lawfare,” the use of international legal institutions to perpetuate inequality under the guise of rules and norms. In this way, international law, when consistently applied, becomes a weapon of decolonization rather than domination.
The principle of multilateralism is also deeply political. In a world still marked by the residues of unipolarity, particularly the dominance of the United States, multilateralism is not simply about cooperation but about redistributing power away from unilateral decision making. The U.S. tariff wars, its retreat from multilateral agreements such as the Paris Climate Accord during the Trump administration, and its continued use of sanctions as instruments of coercion all highlight the dangers of unilateralism. Xi’s call for “true multilateralism” thus exposes the hypocrisy of a global system where multilateral institutions are often captured by the interests of a few powers. Within the SCO, member states are attempting to construct alternative mechanisms, such as proposals for a new development bank and funding initiatives announced at the Tianjin summit, including grants of 2 billion RMB and loans of 10 billion RMB, which represent real economic instruments to counter the financial hegemony of Bretton Woods institutions. The people centered approach is another radical departure from neoliberal paradigms. Neoliberal globalization has often prioritized markets over people, profits over welfare, and privatization over public good. This has led to rising inequality, dispossession, and the weakening of social safety nets across much of the Global South. By contrast, Xi’s framing insists that development must serve people directly, reflecting Marxist critiques of capitalist accumulation that argue for the reorientation of production and governance toward human needs rather than surplus extraction. Within the SCO, this translates into initiatives around health cooperation, digital inclusion, poverty alleviation, and climate resilience areas where neoliberal policies have largely failed. The “Shanghai Spirit” that underpins the SCO emphasizes mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and respect for cultural diversity, principles that are fundamentally people-centered and offer a collective alternative to the alienating effects of neoliberal globalization.
Perhaps most crucially, Xi insists on real actions rather than empty rhetoric. This emphasis reflects the frustration of many Global South states with decades of unmet promises from the Global North, whether in the form of climate finance, trade concessions, or development aid. The failure to deliver the pledged $100 billion annually for climate adaptation by 2020 is just one example of how rhetoric has consistently outpaced reality. In contrast, the SCO’s projects and development initiatives, particularly the new proposals discussed in Tianjin, are framed as tangible contributions that create trust and legitimacy. This reflects a decolonial strategy: by grounding initiatives in action rather than discourse, the SCO challenges the performative dimension of Western dominance, which often relies on lofty promises to maintain moral authority without substantive follow-through. The SCO’s development represents a broader decolonial war of position in the global order. It challenges neoliberalism not with an immediate frontal assault but by constructing alternative institutions, practices, and discourses that gradually erode the legitimacy of Western-dominated structures. The creation of a SCO development bank, alternative financial mechanisms, and emphasis on South-South cooperation all represent practical steps toward decolonization. Moreover, by linking sovereignty, law, multilateralism, people-centered development, and real actions, Xi’s five principles provide the ideological coherence necessary for building a counter hegemonic bloc.
The Tianjin summit’s significance also lies in how it aligns with long standing struggles for emancipation in the Global South. Much like Bandung, it is not merely a diplomatic meeting but a symbolic affirmation that postcolonial states have the right to define the terms of global order. In doing so, it offers a ray of hope for societies long marginalized by imperialism and neoliberalism. It signals to the Global South that emancipation is possible not through isolation or confrontation, but through collective solidarity and the construction of institutions that reflect their values and priorities. At the same time, the Global North views these developments with suspicion, often portraying the SCO as a geopolitical threat rather than a cooperative platform, a response that underscores the challenge that decolonial initiatives pose to entrenched hegemonies. In the broader trajectory of global governance, the SCO’s approach reflects the unfinished work of decolonization. While political independence was achieved in the mid-twentieth century, economic, cultural, and institutional domination persists. Xi’s five principles thus represent not only a geopolitical strategy but also a decolonial project aimed at completing this unfinished business. By rooting governance in sovereign equality, adherence to law, multilateralism, people-centered development, and real action, the SCO charts a path toward a world that is more inclusive, more just, and more reflective of the diverse civilizations and peoples that inhabit it. The 25th SCO summit in Tianjin may well be remembered as a milestone in this struggle. Just as Bandung redefined global politics in the 1950s, Tianjin could mark the moment when a coherent alternative to neoliberal globalization and imperial hegemony began to take root. For the Global South, this represents not just a diplomatic development but an existential one: the possibility of constructing a future where peace and prosperity are shared, not imposed; where cooperation is genuine, not conditional; and where global governance serves the people rather than the powerful. In this sense, the SCO is not simply a regional organization but a decolonial force in world politics, a ray of hope illuminating the path toward global peace, dignity, and sustainable development.
